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Abstract 
We report experimental evidence on gender differences in financial decision-making that 
involves three depositors choosing whether to keep their money deposited or to withdraw it. 
We find that one’s position in the line, the fact that one is being observed and observed 
decisions are key determinants in explaining the subjects’ behavior. Our main result is that 
men and women do not react differently to what is observed. However, there are gender 
differences regarding the effect of being observed: women value the fact of being observed 
more, while men value the number of subsequent depositors who observe them. Interestingly, 
risk aversion has no predictive power on depositors’ behavior. 
 
Keywords: bank run, gender difference, strategic uncertainty, experimental evidence, 
coordination. 
JEL Classification: C91, D03, D8, G02, J16  
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1. Introduction 
Starting with the run on Northern Rock in the UK in 2007, the financial crisis has shown that 
bank runs are still a topic of first-order importance worldwide. Other examples include the 
experiences of Washington Mutual, Bear Stearns, IndyMac Bank, the Bank of East Asia and 
the fourth largest lender in Spain, Bankia. 
During the previous waves of bank runs (the last occurred during the Great Depression), the 
proportion of male depositors was higher than that of female depositors. However, due to 
social progress and changes in labor conditions, the gap in the proportion of men and women 
among banks’ depositors is closing. Currently, roughly half of the customers with an account 
at a formal financial institution in the US are women; this finding is in contrast to past data 
(e.g., according to Wright (1999), in 1828, only 11% of the customers of a bank in 
Philadelphia were women).1 Similar changes are taking place in developing countries, so it is 
interesting to determine whether there are gender differences in depositors’ behavior. 
Gender differences in preferences have been identified in several dimensions (see Croson and 
Gneezy, 2009 for a review), and these results may have relevant implications concerning how 
bank runs unfold. More concretely, episodes of bank runs involve depositors observing (at 
least partially) what other depositors have done (Iyer and Puri, 2012; Kelly and O’Grada, 
2000), and men and women may react differently to their observations of others’ actions or 
the fact that they are being observed. Moreover, women generally exhibit a higher degree of 
risk aversion (e.g., Charness and Gneezy, 2012; Croson and Gneezy, 2009), making them 
possibly more likely to withdraw funds early to guarantee a sure payoff. 
We report experimental evidence on gender differences in depositor decision-making. Our 
experimental design is based on the coordination problem formulated by Diamond and 
                                                        
1 Data from the World Bank indicate that in the US, 84.1% of women and 92% of men over age 15 have an 
account at a formal financial institution. These amounts (female / male) are fairly close to other developed 
countries (e.g., 88.8% / 92.5% in the Euro area and 96.8% / 96% in Japan), but there are sizable differences in 
less developed countries (e.g., 2.6% /15.4% in Afghanistan  and 17% / 32.7% in North Africa). 
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Dybvig (1983), which we modify to allow for different levels of observability. We consider 
the simplest model, where one impatient depositor needs to withdraw funds immediately and 
two patient depositors with no urgent liquidity needs decide between keeping their funds 
deposited (which we also call “waiting”) and withdrawing their funds, with the former action 
yielding the highest payoff if they both choose it. We define a bank run as a situation in which 
at least one of the patient depositors withdraws funds. In line with Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983), liquidity needs are private information, and there is no aggregate uncertainty about the 
number of patient and impatient depositors. One noteworthy aspect of our design, however, is 
that depositors choose sequentially between waiting or withdrawing their money, implying 
that i) depositors may observe what other depositors have done before making their decision, 
and ii) depositors know whether other depositors will observe their decisions.2  
Based on previous results in the literature (Garratt and Keister 2009; Kiss et al. 2014), we 
hypothesize that in addition to gender, three forces may affect the decisions of the patient 
depositors. The first concerns their observations of other depositors’ decisions. For example, 
knowing that another depositor has already withdrawn funds may foster panicking behavior 
and favor further withdrawals because a patient depositor observing that someone else 
withdraws funds does not know if (s)he is observing an impatient or a patient depositor. On 
the other hand, depositors at the beginning of the line may behave differently if subsequent 
depositors are observing their actions. More precisely, if a patient depositor is observed by the 
other depositors, then (s)he may decide to wait to induce the other patient depositor to wait as 
well, guaranteeing the highest possible payoff. Finally, we aim to analyze whether attitudes 
toward risk have some predictive power in depositors’ decisions because risk aversion has 
been frequently considered a key determinant in financial decisions.  
                                                        
2
 Sequential decisions have recently been considered in bank run experiments (see Schotter and Yorulmazer, 
2009; Garratt and Keister, 2009; Kiss et al. 2012, 2014). 
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In addition to the previously mentioned factors, this paper also examines whether there are 
gender differences in withdrawal decisions after controlling for risk preferences. Gender 
differences in other financial settings (apart from depositor behavior) have been studied 
extensively. Many studies analyze gender differences in different investment decisions and in 
portfolio selection (e.g., Bernasek and Shwiff, 2001; Sunden and Surette, 1998; Watson and 
McNaughton, 2007; Dwyer, Gilkeson and List, 2002; Felton, Gibson and Sanbonmatsu, 2003; 
and Martenson, 2008), finding that women are more risk averse and choose more 
conservative investment strategies. Other papers find gender differences in the way people 
reacted to the recent financial crisis (see, for instance, Söderberg and Wester, 2012), finding 
that women were less likely to take action in response to the distress. Although there is a 
growing experimental and empirical literature on bank runs (see Schotter and Yorulmazer, 
2009; Garratt and Keister, 2009; Starr and Yilmaz, 2007; Iyer and Puri, 2012; Brown, 
Trautmann and Vlahu, 2012, for some recent examples, and Dufwenberg, 2012, for a survey 
on experimental banking, including a section on bank runs), to the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first experimental study that specifically investigates gender differences in this context. 
We are only aware of two empirical studies that refer to gender differences in bank run 
situations (Kelly and O’Grada, 2000; O’Grada and White, 2003). Both study two bank runs in 
New York in 1854 and 1857, and gender was not clearly found to play a role in explaining 
panicking behavior. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the bank run 
game that is played in our experiment, which is detailed in Section 3. We summarize our 
research questions in Section 4. Section 5 contains the experimental results, and Section 6 
concludes. 
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2. The bank run game with observability of actions 
In this section, we describe the coordination problem that is played in each round of the 
experiment. We extend the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) to allow for observability 
of actions, following Kiss et al. (2014). The game has three different stages, as detailed 
below.  
 
Time t=0. Deposits 
At t=0, a bank with three depositors is formed. Each depositor deposits her/his initial 
endowment (in our experiment, 80 ECUs) in this bank, which therefore initially has 240 
ECUs to be invested in a project. The project yields a guaranteed high return in period t=2, 
but the investment can be liquidated at no cost at t=1. 
 
Time t=1. Types, network structure and depositors’ decisions. 
At t=1, the depositors must choose whether they want to withdraw their money from the bank 
or keep it deposited. We assume that one of the depositors is hit by a liquidity shock at the 
beginning of t=1 and is forced to withdraw money. We follow Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
and further assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty about the liquidity demand; i.e., it is 
common knowledge that one of the three depositors will need the money and will withdraw 
with certainty. We refer to this depositor as the impatient depositor, whereas the depositors 
who can wait to withdraw their money are called patient depositors. 
Both the patient and impatient depositors choose their actions in an exogenously determined 
sequence. Depositor i chooses in position i, where i = 1,2,3. Before choosing between 
withdrawing or waiting, depositor i learns whether a subsequent depositor j > i will observe 
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his/her choice. If depositor j does observe the choice of depositor i, we say that the link ij 
exists, for i,j ∈ {1,2,3}, and i < j. 3 
We model the information flow among the depositors through a network. A network is the set 
of existing links among the depositors. In our setup, there are 8 possible networks: (12, 13, 
23), (12, 13), (12, 23), (13, 23), (12), (13), (23), (∅), where (∅) stands for the empty network 
that has no links at all, whereas the structure (12, 13, 23) contains all of the possible links; i.e., 
the link 12, the link 13 and the link 23. This later network therefore represents a fully 
sequential setup, meaning that the depositors observe all of their predecessors’ actions. In 
particular, i) depositor 1 knows that depositors 2 and 3 will observe his/her decision, ii) 
depositor 2 chooses after learning what depositor 1 has done and is aware that depositor 3 will 
observe his/her decision, and iii) depositor 3 makes his/her decision after learning what 
depositors 1 and 2 have done. The empty network (∅) represents the opposite situation. This 
network resembles the simultaneous move in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), where depositors 
decide with no information about the other depositors’ actions.4 In our model, depositors have 
only local knowledge of the information structure; that is, they know their own links but do 
not know whether the other two depositors are linked.5  
The depositors’ payoffs are independent of their type and of the network structure, but their 
payoffs do depend on their position in the line and their decisions. If a depositor decides to 
withdraw, (s)he immediately receives 100 ECUs as long as there is enough money in the bank 
to pay this amount (out of this amount, 80 ECUs correspond to the initial endowment and 20 
ECUs are obtained in the form of interest). In our experiment, if depositors 1 or 2 withdraw, 
they definitely receive 100 ECUs. However, if depositor 3 decides to withdraw after two 
                                                        
3
 As a natural consequence of the existence of the link ij, depositor j chooses after learning what depositor i has 
done, for i < j and i,j ∈  {1,2,3}. 
4 However, position in the line is known in our setup. 
5
 For instance, in the complete network (12,13,23) depositor 3 chooses after observing what depositors 1 and 2 
have done. Because depositor 3 does only know his/her own links, (s)he does not know whether depositor 2 has 
observed depositor 1’s decision or not. In that regard, when depositor 3 chooses, (s)he does not know whether 
(s)he is in network(12,13,23) or (13,23). Both possibilities are equally likely in our framework.  
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withdrawals, (s)he only receives 40 ECUs (because the first two depositors who withdrew 
received 100 ECUs each, and the bank has only 40 ECUs to pay depositor 3). However, if 
depositor 3 withdraws after less than two withdrawals, the bank pays her/him 100 ECUs.  
 
Time t=2. Depositors who waited receive their payoffs.  
Depositors who decide to wait at t=1 receive their payoff in period t=2. The amount that the 
depositors receive in t=2 depends on the total number of waitings. If only one depositor keeps 
her/his money deposited, (s)he receives 60 ECUs. If two depositors wait, then their payoff is 
140 ECUs.6  
 
Coordination problem and strategic uncertainty  
Our game is such that for patient depositors, the payoff consequences of each decision can be 
summarized in the following table.7 
 
Table 1: The payoff table 
 
Given these payoffs, depositor 3 should always wait if (s)he is patient.8 For a patient depositor 
in position 1 or 2, it pays off to wait if (s)he knows or believes that the other patient depositor 
                                                        
6
 Remember that one of the three depositors is impatient and always withdraws at t=1. 
7
 The subjects received a copy of this table in the instructions for the experiment, where the computer that acted 
as the impatient depositor was programmed to always withdraw (see Section 3). 
8 In our setup, waiting in position 3 yields 140 ECUs (60 ECUs) if only the impatient depositor has withdrawn 
(if in addition to the impatient depositor, the other patient depositor has withdrawn), whereas withdrawing yields 
100 ECUs (40 ECUs). We note that the amount that a patient depositor receives if (s)he waits alone (60 ECUs) is 
smaller than her initial endowment (80 ECUs) but larger than the amount that remains in the bank after two 
withdrawals (40 ECUs). The rationale for these payoffs can be related to the idea of partial deposit insurance. If 
a bank run is already underway, depositors who decided to wait may receive more than what remains in the bank 
after paying all of the depositors in t=1, although these depositors may not receive their initial endowment. Kiss 
et al. (2012) investigate how the level of deposit insurance affects depositors’ decisions, depending on whether 
the decisions are sequential or simultaneous. Another possible interpretation of the payoffs (that we use in our 
experiment) is that the amount not withdrawn from the bank earns money on the project that it was invested in. 
The project yields a sure return, but benefits will depend upon the amount that is invested in the project till the 
end.  
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does so as well. We define a bank run as a situation in which at least one of the patient 
depositors withdraws.  
Although this situation resembles the coordination problem in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
one distinctive feature of our model is that other depositors’ decisions can be observed, 
depending on the network structure, which substantially affects the degree of strategic 
uncertainty. As is standard in the literature, we define strategic uncertainty as uncertainty 
regarding the purposeful decision of players in an interactive situation. More precisely, in a 
setup in which a patient depositor observes a withdrawal, (s)he will not know if the 
withdrawal was due to the impatient depositor or to the patient depositor who decided to run 
the bank. If a patient depositor observes a waiting, there is no doubt about the action of the 
other patient depositor (i.e., strategic uncertainty disappears). This feature is absent in the 
study by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), where decisions are taken simultaneously (i.e., patient 
depositors always choose without knowing what other depositors do). 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
We recruited a total of 60 subjects (30 men and 30 women) with no previous experience in 
coordination problems or experiments on financial decisions. We ran two sessions at the 
Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics (LINEEX) of Universidad de Valencia 
in June 2013, with an even distribution of genders within each session. All of the participants 
in the experiment were students from the Economic and Business School at the university. 
The men and women who participated in the experiment did not differ by background, 
minimizing the possibility of a selection bias.9 
The experiment was programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions 
were read aloud and the bank run game described in Section 2 was played for 15 rounds. At 
                                                        
9
 The Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that there are no gender differences with regard to age or major (p-values = 
0.5535 and 0.8416, respectively). See Appendix B for further details.  
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the beginning of each round, each subject was informed that (s)he had been matched 
randomly with another subject and assigned a third depositor (simulated by the computer) to 
form a three-depositor bank. Likewise, each subject was told that (s)he had deposited her/his 
initial endowment (80 ECUs) in the common bank. All of this information was known 
publicly, as was the fact that the computer was programmed to always withdraw and would 
act as the impatient depositor. Appendix A contains the instructions. 
In each round, each depositor was privately informed about her/his position in the sequence of 
decisions (i=1,2,3). It was common knowledge that this position was randomly and 
exogenously determined, so subjects were equally likely to be at any position. The depositors 
then decided in sequence (according to their position in the line) whether to withdraw their 
money from the bank or keep it deposited. If the action of a depositor would be observed by 
some subsequent depositor, (s)he was also informed. Similarly, if a depositor was observing a 
predecessor in the line, (s)he was informed about that depositor’s action before making 
her/his own decision. In Figure 1, we present some screenshots from our experiment. 
 
Figure 1. Screenshots for depositors 1 and 2. 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the network structure was presented graphically to the subjects on the 
right-hand side of the screen. On the left-hand side, a block of text informed the subjects 
about their position in that round and verbally summarized the (local) information flow 
among the depositors. In Figure 1A, we illustrate the case of depositor 1, who knows that 
depositor 2 will observe her/his decision. Because there is no link between depositor 1 and 
depositor 3, depositor 1 knows that depositor 3 will not observe her/his action. The fact that 
the information is local implies that depositor 1 is unaware whether depositor 3 observes 
depositor 2 (note the “?” symbol on the line that connects depositors 2 and 3). Figure 1B 
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presents the case of a depositor 2 who has observed a waiting and must then decide what to 
do. Depositor 2 knows that depositor 3 will observe her/his decision. At the bottom of the 
screen, the subjects were reminded of the payoff consequences of each possible action and the 
fact that the computer was programmed to always withdraw (acting as the impatient 
depositor). 
In each round, the subjects were asked to choose between waiting or withdrawing, with their 
position in the line and the information structure changing across rounds (i.e., in each round, 
the subjects were placed in a different position and / or they were placed in a different 
network so that their links were different).10  
In both sessions, the subjects were divided into three matching groups of 10. Subjects from 
different matching groups never interacted with each other during the session. Subjects within 
the same matching group were randomly and anonymously matched in pairs at the end of 
each round.  
At the end of the experiment, the subjects filled out a questionnaire that was used to collect 
additional information about gender and degree of risk aversion. We elicited risk attitudes 
using the investment decision in the study by Gneezy and Potters (1997). Each subject 
hypothetically received 10 Euros and was asked to choose how much of it, $x, (s)he wanted to 
invest in a risky option and how much (s)he wished to keep. The amount invested yielded a 
dividend $2.5x with ½ probability; it was otherwise lost. The money not invested in the risky 
option $(10-x) was kept by the subject. In this situation, the expected value of investing is 
higher than the expected value of not investing; therefore, a risk-neutral (or risk-loving) 
subject should invest the 10 Euros, whereas a risk-averse subject will invest less. The amount 
not invested in the risky asset is a natural measure of risk aversion.11 
                                                        
10
 Observations are balanced across networks so that men and women are equally likely to decide in any 
particular network (see Appendix B) 
11
 Our questionnaire also contained four different lotteries in the spirit of Holt and Laury (2002). Although 
henceforth we use the risk aversion elicited á la Gneezy and Potters (1997), we can also proxy risk aversion by 
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Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes, and the subjects received on average 16 Euros. 
For the payment, we used a random lottery incentive procedure by which one choice (i.e., one 
of the rounds) was paid out, with ECUs transformed into Euros using the exchange rate 10 
ECUs = 1 Euro.  
 
 
4. Research questions  
We want to explore gender differences in behavior in a bank run situation, where depositors 
may observe other depositors’ actions. Kiss et al. (2014) show that if they are being observed, 
depositors tend to wait to induce other depositors to follow suit.12 Our first research question 
is therefore to investigate gender differences in behavior when depositors know that 
subsequent depositor(s) will observe their decisions.  
Q1. How do men and women behave when nobody observes their choices? How do they 
choose when they know that subsequent depositor(s) will observe their decisions?  
In our game, patient depositors receive the highest possible payoff if they coordinate on 
waiting, but they can observe what another depositor has done before only if the network 
structure allows them to do so. In turn, depositors’ decisions can take place in the presence 
(absence) of strategic uncertainty. As noted in Section 2, strategic uncertainty is absent if a 
subject can infer the decision of another subject in the room without a problem before 
deciding what to do. Depositor 1 has no information about what other depositors have done 
when making his/her choice, so (s)he always decides in an environment of strategic 
uncertainty. Depositors 2 and 3, however, make their decisions in the absence of strategic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the number of times that a subject made the risky choice in the Holt and Laury task. The results presented in the 
next section are invariant to the measure of risk aversion that we use because both measures are correlated 
(Correlation coefficient = 0.26, p-value < 0.0000). Appendix B presents further details about our measures of 
risk aversion.  
12 This finding is in line with experimental evidence in public good games showing that if they are set in a 
network structure, subjects may decide to contribute to show their strategic commitment (Choi et al., 2011). 
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uncertainty if they observe a waiting, or if depositor 3 observes the two previous actions. 
When depositor 2 or depositor 3 observes either nothing or a withdrawal, their decisions are 
made in a context of strategic uncertainty. Our second research question is aimed at assessing 
the importance of strategic uncertainty as well as investigating how men and women react to 
what they observe.13  
Q2. Does strategic uncertainty (e.g., the observation of a withdrawal) favor withdrawals? Do 
men and women react differently to what they observe?  
One of the areas in which gender differences have been observed is risk attitudes. In that vein, 
an interesting question to be addressed concerns the predictive power of risk aversion. 
Consider a patient depositor at position 1. Upon withdrawal, (s)he definitely receives 100 
ECUs, while waiting may yield 140 ECUs or 60 ECUs, depending on the decision of the other 
patient depositor. Let p denote the probability that the patient depositor in position 1 assigns 
to the event that the other patient depositor will wait. Depositor 1 will be indifferent between 
waiting and withdrawal if 
100 = 140 + 1 − 60                                                   (1) 
If we assume that utilities are described by the constant relative risk aversion utility function14 
 =


, where γ >1 represents the degree of risk aversion, then we can substitute it into 
the above expression and obtain: 
 =
100 − 60
140 − 60
 
The derivative of p with respect to γ is positive, indicating that the probability assigned to the 
event that the other depositor waits should be higher for more risk-averse depositors, so that 
                                                        
13
 To the best of our knowledge, there are no other studies that investigate how men and women react when 
varying the degree of strategic uncertainty, although there are studies that investigate gender differences in 
games that are characterized by strategic uncertainty (e.g., in the ultimatum game, strategic uncertainty arises 
because the proposer does not know the minimum acceptable offer of the responder). In these games, no clear, 
general difference in choices between men and women has been identified. 
14
 This assumption is common in the theoretical literature on bank runs. For instance, Green and Lin (2003) and 
Ennis and Keister (2009) use this utility function that cleanly captures risk aversion through γ. 
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the indifference relation holds.15 Therefore, more risk-averse depositors are willing to wait 
only if they are more optimistic about the other depositor's decision. More precisely, if two 
depositors have the same belief about the likelihood of successful coordination, and for the 
less risk-averse depositor relation (1) holds, then the more risk-averse depositor prefers 
withdrawal to waiting. 16   Heinemann et al. (2009) find that risk aversion is negatively 
correlated with the likelihood of choosing the risky choice in a coordination game (for further 
evidence, see Goeree et al. 2003), although gender differences are not analyzed. 
Q3. Does risk aversion predict withdrawal decisions? Do women (who are generally more 
risk averse than men) withdraw more often than men do, ceteris paribus? 
 
5. Experimental Results 
5.1. Aggregate Data 
This section presents our main results. In Figure 2, we report the likelihood of withdrawal in 
each position by gender. Figure 2 shows that the position in the line affects the depositors’ 
behavior, with depositors more likely to withdraw in position 1 or 2 than in position 3. 
Remember that depositor 3 has a dominant strategy and should always wait if patient. Gender 
does not seem to systematically affect depositors’ behavior. We observe that women (men) 
withdraw more frequently in position 2 and position 3 (position 1), but gender differences are 
never significant (p-values > 0.146).17 
Figure 2: Decisions in each position by gender 
                                                        
15
 This result does not depend on the specific payoffs, and it holds for any payoff scheme that has the same 
relationship between payoffs: the highest payoff goes to the patient depositors if both wait, followed by the 
payoff related to withdrawal, and the lowest payoff corresponds to waiting alone. 
16  Heinemann et al. (2009) find evidence that supports the idea that participants decide as if they have 
probabilistic beliefs about the outcome of coordination games. There is scarce empirical or experimental 
evidence about the relationship between risk aversion and belief about another individual's decision. Fehr-Duda 
et al. (2006) elicit probability weights using gambles and find that on average, women are more pessimistic than 
men in the gain domain, and they are also more risk averse. Translated to our environment, this result would 
imply that women believe less in obtaining the largest payoff (140 ECUs) through successful coordination. 
17
 Unless otherwise noted, the tests refer to the t-test and the Mann–Whitney U.  
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As noted above, we are interested in looking at the depositors’ behavior and gender 
differences in behavior with regard to strategic uncertainty. In Figure 3, we group the data 
according to the cases in which depositors 2 and 3 choose in the presence (absence) of 
strategic uncertainty. We do not consider this distinction for depositor 1 because (s)he always 
decides in a context of strategic uncertainty. 
In line with Figure 2, we observe that men and women behave similarly once we condition on 
the presence or absence of strategic uncertainty and on a particular position in the line (p-
values > 0.443).  
Figure 3: Decisions by gender in presence/absence of strategic uncertainty 
This finding is in line with previous evidence in the literature on coordination problems that 
reports no gender differences (e.g., Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2005; Heinemann et al. 2009), 
although our game differs from the previous studies in that we allow for the observability of 
actions that are conditional on the information structure. Along these lines, one interesting 
insight from Figure 3 is that strategic uncertainty increases the withdrawal rate for both men 
and women in positions 2 and 3 (p-values < 0.0080). This finding highlights the importance 
of strategic uncertainty, although gender differences are not crucial in explaining the 
depositors’ behavior.  
 
5.2. Depositors’ behavior and observability of actions 
In our context, the position in the line and the information structure determine what depositors 
observe and whether subsequent depositors can observe their actions. To disentangle whether 
there are gender differences in the effects of these variables on the withdrawal decision, we 
analyze the depositors’ behavior in more detail by performing an econometric analysis. We 
16 
 
estimate a logit model on the probability of withdrawal in each position. The set of 
independent variables includes the subject’s gender, the observation possibilities and the 
interaction effects. Our regressions also control for risk aversion, which is measured using the 
investment decision in Gneezy and Potters (1997).18 Because the subjects are asked to make 
decisions during 15 rounds, we also control for the history of decisions, as in the study by 
Garratt and Keister (2009). In particular, the variable History measures the proportion of 
previous rounds in which the subject witnessed a bank run. Next, we analyze the behavior of 
each depositor separately by focusing on the observability of actions in Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2 
and 5.2.3. We discuss the predictive power of the history of decisions and the degree of risk 
aversion in Section 5.2.4. 
 
5.2.1. Depositor 1’s behavior 
When depositor 1 chooses whether to wait or withdraw, (s)he has no information about what 
will occur in the bank. However, depositor 1 does know whether subsequent depositors will 
observe her/his decision, which can affect depositor 1’s decision because a patient depositor 
would like to wait to induce the other patient depositor to follow suit. Our data are consistent 
with such a behavioral pattern. When they are not being observed, men withdraw 57% of the 
time, and women withdraw 64% of the time. These withdrawal rates decrease to 32% and 
24%, respectively, when one other depositor will observe the action of the first depositor, and 
to 11% and 16%, respectively, when depositor 1 knows that the two subsequent depositors 
will observe her/his action.  
                                                        
18
 Our data for risk aversion are consistent with previous evidence (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009 or Charness 
and Gneezy 2012 for a summary of results) that finds that men invest significantly more than women. In our 
sample, women invest on average 4.97 and men 5.80 (p-value= 0.064). Along these lines, we find that men make 
more risky choices in lotteries than women in the Holt and Laury task (p-value= 0.001). Both the investment 
decision and the Holt and Laury task yield a measure of risk aversion that is significantly correlated with gender 
(p-values = 0.044 and 0.007, respectively), with women being more risk averse using both measures.  
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In the logit specification, the independent variables are the subject’s gender (W is equal to 0 
for men and 1 for women), the number of subsequent followers observing the depositors (F1 
equals 1 if depositor 1 is observed by only one depositor, and F2 equals 1 if depositor 1 is 
observed by two depositors) and the interaction effects, controlling for risk aversion and 
history (History). In Table 2, we report our estimates, the standard errors of the parameters 
(which take into account the matching group clustering) and the marginal effects for three 
different models. In the first model, we consider the pooled data and control for gender 
differences in behavior using dummy variables. Men and women’s behavior are analyzed 
separately in the remaining two specifications.  
Table 2: Logit regression for depositor 1. 
We do not find gender differences in the baseline model where the depositors’ actions are not 
observed (F1 = F2 = 0). Our estimates indicate that both men and women value that their 
actions will be observed because they are less likely to withdraw if one or two other 
depositors observe their actions (p-values < 0.0186).19 We also find that men and women 
react differently to the fact of being observed, with a decrease in the withdrawal rate that is 
higher for women when we compare the case in which no action is observed with the case in 
which one action is observed (χ2 = 3.36, p-value = 0.0669). The marginal effects show that 
having one link decreases the probability of withdrawing in 44% for women and 24.8% for 
men.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
19
 All of the tests in this section refer to the χ2 test after running our first specification, which is the only one in 
which we can test for gender differences. All of the insights about men and women’s behavior are consistent 
when we analyze their behaviors in the separate regressions.  
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Result 1.  
i) Women initiate bank runs as frequently as men when their decisions are not observed.  
ii) When one subsequent depositor observes their decisions, the likelihood of withdrawal 
decreases for both men and women, although the decrease is higher for women, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
We can also study the depositor 1’s behavior when (s)he has two links. When both subsequent 
depositors observe their decision, both men and women are significantly less likely to 
withdraw compared with the case in which the decision is not observed. Statistically, we 
reject the null hypothesis that the withdrawal rate of men when they have one subsequent 
observing depositor is the same as the withdrawal rate when they have two observing 
depositors (χ2 =  5.69, p-value = 0.0171), while women do not care about the number of 
subsequent depositors that observe their choices; i.e., we cannot reject the previous null 
hypothesis for women at any common significance level (χ2 = 0.01, p-value = 0.9390). This 
finding seems to indicate that men are more concerned about the number of subsequent 
depositors who will observe their decisions.  
 
5.2.2. Depositor 2 
Depositor 2 may choose after observing nothing (ObsNo) or after having observed what 
depositor 1 has already done. In the latter case, depositor 2 can either observe a waiting 
(ObsWa) or a withdrawal (ObsWi). Interestingly, the observation of a withdrawal arises in a 
context of strategic uncertainty because depositor 2 is not able to identify if the withdrawal 
was made by the computer or by the other subject in the room. Figure 3 already suggests that 
strategic uncertainty may play an important role. Depositor 2 is more likely to withdraw upon 
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observing nothing or observing a withdrawal than upon observing a waiting. Being observed 
may also influence depositor 2’s decision.  
To determine whether there are gender differences in depositor 2’s behavior, we perform an 
econometric analysis. Our baseline model relies on the case in which depositor 2 observes 
nothing. The dummy variable ObsWi (ObsWa) takes the value 1 if a withdrawal (a waiting) is 
observed, with W standing for the depositor’s gender. We interact these dummies to 
investigate whether men and women react differently to what is being observed. We also take 
into account that depositor 2’s decision may be observed by depositor 3 (i.e., the dummy 
variable F1 takes the value 1 in this case). To distinguish between men and women’s reactions 
to what is being observed when there is (not) a link with depositor 3, we interact depositor 2’s 
gender and what is being observed with F1. Finally, we control for the degree of risk aversion 
and what the subjects observed in previous rounds (History), as we did in the case of 
depositor 1. Our estimates for this specification are reported in Table 3, which also presents 
the regressions in which men and women’s behavior is studied separately.20 
Table 3: Logit regression for depositor 2. 
Our estimates indicate that observing a withdrawal does not have any influence on men’s or 
women’s behavior (p-values>0.2526), whereas the observation of a waiting significantly 
decreases their likelihood of withdrawal (p-values<0.0000).21 This result implies that we can 
easily reject the null hypothesis that the depositors’ decisions are invariant to what is being 
observed (p-values<0.0000). When we look at gender differences in behavior, we do not find 
any evidence that men and women behave differently, either in the baseline model where 
nothing is observed (p-value=0.218), or when a waiting or a withdrawal is observed (p-
                                                        
20
 We note that the dummy variables F1ObsWa, WObsWa and WF1ObsWa have been eliminated from the 
analysis because i) men who observed a waiting and know that their actions will be observed, and ii) women 
who observe a waiting (regardless of whether they are linked with depositor 3) never withdraw their money from 
the bank; i.e., F1ObsWa, WObsWa and WF1ObsWa predict waiting perfectly.  
21
 In fact, depositor 2 waits in 53 out of the 54 cases when (s)he observes a waiting, while depositor 2 waits in 
only 39 out of the 94 occasions in which (s)he observes a withdrawal.  
20 
 
values>0.2259). Overall, these findings are in line with our description of Figure 3 and 
highlight that strategic uncertainty is the major force driving depositors’ behavior, with men 
and women withdrawing more frequently when nothing or a withdrawal is observed. Thus, 
women and men react similarly to what they observe.  
 
Result 2.  
Withdrawal rates increase in situations of strategic uncertainty (i.e., when nothing or a 
withdrawal is observed), but we do not find evidence of gender differences in behavior.  
 
One interesting insight from our regression analysis is that men do care about their link with 
depositor 3 (p-values < 0.0050), whereas women do not value the fact that they are being 
observed by depositor 3 (p-values > 0.6028). This finding is in line with our previous finding, 
men being affected by the number of links. 
 
5.2.3. Depositor 3  
Depositor 3 is always better off waiting, and the subjects did so in 90% of the cases. 
Interestingly, the descriptions of our data in Figures 2 and 3 indicate that withdrawals in 
position 3 occur when there is strategic uncertainty and depositor 3 is not able to infer what 
the other patient depositor has done.  
To investigate whether gender differences are important for depositor 3, we estimate a logit 
model in which the baseline specification assumes that there is no strategic uncertainty; i.e., 
we pool the cases in which a waiting or the two previous actions are observed.22 We then 
define the dummy variable StrUnc, which takes the value 1 if a withdrawal or nothing is 
                                                        
22 Observing two withdrawals or a waiting and a withdrawal predicts waiting perfectly for both men and women. 
Men never withdraw if a waiting and a withdrawal is observed, whereas 4 out of the 32 women withdraw in this 
scenario. We note that these 4 choices are due to 2 subjects. 
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observed. Our specification controls for gender, risk aversion and the history of decisions, and 
our estimates are presented in Table 4.23  
Table 4: Logit regression for depositor 3. 
We observe that strategic uncertainty does not have any significant effect on men’s behavior, 
and the same is true for women. Along similar lines, gender has no predictive power in 
explaining withdrawal rates because the hypothesis that men and women behave in the same 
manner both when there is strategic uncertainty (p-value = 0.9642) and when there is not (p-
value = 0.8811) cannot be rejected.  
 
Result 3.  
We find that neither gender nor strategic uncertainty have an effect on the depositors’ 
behavior in position 3. 
 
5.2.4. History of decisions and risk aversion 
In addition to the described effects of gender, observability and strategic uncertainty, one 
other important finding is that risk aversion is not significant in any of the regressions. On the 
contrary, the history of decisions seems to have predictive power because the frequency of 
bank runs that the subject witnessed tends to increase the likelihood of withdrawal in any 
position. While the latter result is in line with Garratt and Keister (2009) and Kiss et al. 
(2014), the former result notes that the decisions in our setup are not driven by attitude toward 
risk.24  
 
                                                        
23
 We define only a dummy for the case of strategic uncertainty because we have a very small number of 
withdrawals for depositor 3, and therefore there is little variability in the data. With a more detailed model, we 
would require more regressors and hence a more complicated specification, without any additional insight. 
24
 Even when we omit risk aversion from the regressions, gender does not become significant in the baseline 
cases. 
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Result 4. Women are more risk averse than men, but they are not more likely to participate in 
a bank run (i.e., risk aversion does not predict withdrawal decisions). 
 
Risk aversion is often related to subjects’ behavior in financial decisions. In the particular 
case of depositor decision-making, the fact that women are usually more risk averse may 
suggest that they are more likely to withdraw early to secure a sure payoff instead of facing 
strategic uncertainty and thus an uncertain payoff. Hence, women may be expected to initiate 
or participate in bank runs more. We find that women are more risk averse than men, but risk 
aversion seems to play no role in withdrawal decisions. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
After the recent financial turmoil, researchers have shown keen interest in studying what 
factors affect the widespread appearance and propagation of bank runs. One interesting 
question to be addressed is how men and women behave in this context, an issue that has been 
disregarded by the literature.  
We present experimental data where depositor decision-making is modeled as a coordination 
game (as originally proposed by Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), with depositors choosing 
sequentially between waiting and withdrawing after potentially observing previous decisions.  
Similarly to Kiss et al. (2014), our results highlight that the information structure is a key 
element in explaining the subjects’ behavior. Our main contribution is to show that men and 
women are equally likely to initiate bank runs, and they react to observations of previous 
decisions in a similar manner. We find that both men and women value the fact that their 
actions will be observed, although there are gender differences worth noting: whereas women 
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are more affected than men by the fact of being observed, men are more concerned about the 
number of subsequent depositors who will observe their decisions.  
When we investigate how men and women react to what is being observed, we find that 
strategic uncertainty (e.g., observing nothing or a withdrawal) has predictive power in our 
sample by increasing the likelihood of withdrawal, but again no gender difference in behavior 
is found.  
One interesting finding in our paper relates to attitudes toward risk. There is a robust literature 
on the existence of a gender difference regarding risk aversion. Consistent with previous 
findings, our data indicate that women are more risk averse than men (e.g., Charness and 
Gneezy, 2012; Croson and Gneezy, 2009), but this risk aversion does not translate into more 
panicky behavior. Numerous studies show that women and men behave differently when 
making financial decisions due to differences in risk aversion. We provide evidence that this 
behavioral difference does not occur in our particular setup, which resembles depositor 
decision-making. 
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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions (originally in Spanish) 
Welcome to the experiment! 
This is an experiment to study decision making, so we are not interested in your particular 
choices but in individuals' average behavior. Therefore, during the experiment, you will be 
treated anonymously. Neither the experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know 
your particular choices.  
You will find the instructions on the computer screen explaining how the experiment will 
unfold. The instructions are the same for all of the subjects in the laboratory and will be read 
aloud by the experimenters. It is important that you understand the experiment before 
beginning because the money that you will earn will depend on your choices.  
Should you have any problem during the experiment, please raise your hand and remember 
that you are not allowed to speak with anyone except the experimenter. 
Number of rounds 
This experiment has 18 rounds in total. The first 3 rounds are for you to become familiar with 
the software. The remaining 15 rounds will be used to determine your final payoff, so please 
ensure that you understand the experiment before starting the 4th round; this will help you 
earn more money.  
Deposits 
At the beginning of each round, you will be provided a certain amount of money (80 ECUs) 
to be deposited in a bank. The bank in which you will invest your money will be formed by 3 
depositors: one of them is you, one is someone else in this room and the third depositor is 
simulated by the computer. Therefore, the bank in which you deposit your money will have 
240 ECUs per round in total.  
Decisions and earnings 
In principle, your decision is to choose whether to withdraw your money from the common 
bank in the first period or to wait until the second period, taking into account that your 
earnings will depend not only on your choice but also on other depositors' choices. It is 
important that you know that the computer will always withdraw its money; thus, your 
earnings in each round will depend only on your choice and the choice of the other depositor 
in this room.  
Specifically, if you both wait until the second period to withdraw your money, you will 
receive 140 ECUs, corresponding to your initial investment (80 ECUs) plus interest generated 
during the first period (during which you decided to wait).  
If only one of you withdraws the money, then the one who withdraws takes 100 ECUs (which 
is the same amount that the computer will take in this case). The depositor who waits will 
receive 60 ECUs (corresponding to the remaining amount in the bank after two withdrawals – 
40 ECUs plus an additional 20 ECUs interest).  
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Finally, it might be the case that both of you withdraw your money in the first period. As a 
result, your earnings will depend on the available amount of money in the bank and your 
position in the line. Therefore, if you are at Position 1 or Position 2 in the line and decide to 
withdraw, you will receive 100 ECUs, but if you are the last one in the line (Position 3), only 
40 ECUs remain in the bank, and that is the amount that you will receive.  
Therefore, your payoffs can be summarized in the following table:  
  
 
If you decide to wait in the first year and 
withdraw in the second year 
 
Number of previous 
withdrawals 
 
If you withdraw in 
the first year 
If you both wait 
and only the 
computer 
withdraws  
If, in addition to the 
computer, the other 
depositor 
withdraws 
0 100 140 60 
1 100 140 60 
2 40 Not applicable 60 
Please remember that the depositor simulated by the computer will always withdraw its 
money in the first period.  
Before beginning, please consider that:  
1. The person with whom you are linked will change every round. As a result, do not think 
that you are going to play the whole game with the same person.  
2. You will always know your position in the line, but this position might change in each 
round. In particular, you may be located in Position 1, Position 2 or Position 3 with the same 
probability. The same is true for the computer.  
3. In each round, you will have different information about what the other depositors at your 
bank have done. Therefore, in some cases, you will know what has happened before you 
arrived at the bank (number of waitings and withdrawals), but in some other cases, you will 
not. When you make your choice, you will also know whether someone else will observe your 
action. It may be in your interest to consider this information when making your decision. 
This information will appear on the left-hand side of the computer screen.  
E.g.: You are at Position 1. Depositors at Position 2 and Position 3 will observe your action.  
E.g.: You are at Position 2. The depositor at Position 1 has waited. The depositor at Position 
3 will not observe your action.  
On the right-hand side of your screen, a small graph shows with whom you are linked (that is, 
who do you observe and who will observe you). If there is no link between two depositors, 
the text on the screen indicates that the depositor who decides later cannot observe the action 
of the other depositor. If you see “?”, it indicates that you do not know if the other two 
depositors are linked. 
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Final payoff 
When the experiment ends, we randomly choose one of the 15 rounds and pay you according 
to the earnings from that round. We convert your earnings in that round at a rate 10 ECUs = 1 
Euro.  
We are now going to start with the first three rounds. At the end of the three rounds, you can 
ask any questions to ensure that you understand the procedure. If you have any doubts after 
the first three rounds, please raise your hand and remain silent. You will be attended by the 
experimenters as soon as possible. Talking is forbidden during this experiment.  
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Appendix B: Description of the Data 
Selection Bias 
 
One possible concern in studies that investigate gender differences is the possibility of 
selection bias; i.e., men and women recruited for the experiment may differ in their 
background and this feature, rather than gender per se, can explain the observed differences in 
behavior. To illustrate that this bias does not apply in our framework, we show below that 
women and men participating in our experiment come from the same distribution. In 
particular, men and women recruited for our experiment do not differ in their age (figure in 
the left), or the field of studies (figure on the right). Statistically, the Kruskal-Wallis test 
reported in footnote 8 supports that there are no gender differences with regard to age or 
major (p-values = 0.5535 and 0.8416 respectively). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations across networks 
 
We show below that observations are balanced across the different network structures and 
that men/women are equally likely to be taking the decision when we look at a particular 
network structure. In each cell, we report the numbers of observations that correspond to 
men/women choosing in the network. The last column reports the p-values of a test of 
proportion that tests the null hypothesis that the probability of a men (women) deciding in the 
network structure is 0.5. 
 
Network Men Women Total Test proportion 
(12,13,23) 63 63 126 1.000 
(12,13) 48 40 88 0.394 
(12,23) 59 55 114 0.708 
(13,23) 59 63 122 0.727 
(12) 58 58 116 1.000 
(13) 59 51 110 0.446 
(23) 51 61 112 0.345 
∅ 53 59 112 0.571 
 450 450 900  
 
  
Risk Aversion 
 
Gneezy and Potters (1997). We use the 
measure risk aversion. Next we 
separately. The table above the figure summarizes the descriptive statistics. In line with other 
studies (see Croson and Gneezy 2009
are more risk averse than men, as they invest significantly less (Z = 1.849, p
two-tailed).  
 
Table. Invested amount in the investment game in 
 
 
Men 
Women 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Holt and Laury (2002). A series of 4 binary lotteries is presented to subjects, who have to 
choose which is their preferred option. 
men/women made the risky choice. 
 
Table. Number of times that subjects choose the risky choice
 
 
Men 
Women 
 
investment decision in Gneezy and Potters (1997)
show the histogram of decisions for both 
, Charness and Gneezy 2012) we observe that women 
Gneezy and Potters (199
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
5.80 1.94 0 10 
4.97 1.52 0 8 
Next, we summarize the number of times that 
We present the lotteries below the table. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2.07 1.05 0 4 
1.33 0.99 0 3 
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 to 
men and women 
-value = 0.064, 
7) 
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Recall that this is another possible measure for risk aversion. It is correlated with the previous 
one (Correlation coefficient = 0.26, p-value <0.000) and again, women are more risk averse 
than men (p-value = 0.001)  
 
Lottery 1 
Option A: Receive 1000€ regardless of the outcome of tossing a coin. 
Option B: Receive 2000€ if head and nothing (0€) if tail. 
 
Lottery 2 
Option A: Receive a lottery ticket with a 80% probability of earning 45€ and 20% probability 
of earning nothing. 
Option B: Receive 30€. 
 
Lottery 3 
Option A: Receive a lottery ticket with a 20% probability of earning 130€ and 80% 
probability of earning nothing. 
Option B: Receive a lottery ticket with a 25% probability of earning 100€ and 75% 
probability of earning nothing. 
 
Lottery 4 
Option A: Receive a lottery ticket with a 2% probability of earning 3000€ and 98% 
probability of earning nothing. 
Option B: Receive a lottery ticket with a 1% probability of earning 6000€ and 99% 
probability of earning nothing. 
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Table 1 
 
  
 
In you decide to wait in the first year and 
withdraw in the second, the… 
 
Number of previous 
withdrawals 
 
If you withdraw the 
first year 
If you both wait and 
only the computer 
withdraws  
If, in addition to the 
computer, the other 
depositor withdraws 
0 100 140 60 
1 100 140 60 
2 40 Not applicable 60 
Table 1: The payoff table 
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Table 2 
 
 
 
Logit Coefficients Marginal Effect 
 
Pooled Women Men Pooled Women Men 
W -0.413 (1.54)   
-0.070 
(0.27)   
F1 -1.424
*** 
(0.52) 
-2.550*** 
(0.58) 
-1.424*** 
(0.52) 
-0.246*** 
(0.07) 
-0.440*** 
(0.13) 
-0.248*** 
(0.07) 
F2 -3.623
*** 
(0.99) 
-2.614** 
(1.11) 
-3.623*** 
(0.99) 
-0.365*** 
(0.05) 
-0.284** 
(0.13) 
-0.380*** 
(0.05) 
Risk Aversion 0.116 (0.14) 
0.120 
(0.16) 
0.116 
(0.14) 
0.020 
(0.02) 
0.020 
(0.03) 
0.020 
(0.02) 
History 7.178
*** 
(0.99) 
7.626*** 
(1.88) 
7.178*** 
(0.99) 
1.226*** 
(0.24) 
1.273** 
(0.51) 
1.252*** 
(0.28) 
WF1 -1.125 (0.92)   
-0.164 
(0.13)   
WF2 1.009 (1.62)   
0.208 
(0.36) 
 
 
WRiskAv 0.004 (0.24)  
 0.001 
(0.04) 
 
 
WHistory 0.448 (2.52)  
 0.076 
(0.43) 
 
 
Intercept -3.635
*** 
(0.88) 
-4.048*** 
1.01 
-3.635*** 
(0.88)  
 
 
Log-Likelihood -112.14 -54.06 -58.08    
Pseudo R2 0.41 0.41 0.42    
N 299 144 155    
Note. In italics, Robust Std. Error for the Logit regression and Std. Error for Marginal effects.  
Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Table 2: Logit regression for Depositor 1. 
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Table 3 
 
 
 
Logit Coefficients Marginal Effect 
 
Pooled Women Men Pooled Women Men 
W 1.684 (1.98  
 0.376 
0.39 
 
 
ObsWi 0.713 (0.95) 
0.680 
(0.54) 
0.713 
(0.95) 
0.169 
(0.23) 
0.168 
(0.13) 
0.150 
(0.21) 
ObsWa -3.909
*** 
(0.65) (Excl.) 
-3.909*** 
(0.65) 
-0.429*** 
(0.05) (Excl.) 
-0.398*** 
(0.08) 
F1 -1.568
*** 
(0.32) 
-0.413 
(0.80) 
-1.568*** 
(0.32) 
-0.354*** 
(0.07) 
-0.103 
(0.20) 
-0.309*** 
(0.08) 
F1ObsWi 0.378 (0.78) 
0.396 
(0.94) 
0.378 
(0.78) 
0.091 
(0.19) 
0.099 
(0.23) 
0.080 
(0.17) 
Risk Aversion 0.078 (0.16) 
-0.162 
(0.17) 
0.078 
(0.16) 
0.018 
(0.03) 
-0.040 
(0.04) 
0.016 
(0.03) 
History 7.644
*** 
(1.54) 
5.103*** 
(1.25) 
7.644*** 
(1.54) 
1.795*** 
(0.38) 
1.273*** 
(0.32) 
1.553*** 
(0.38) 
WObsWi -0.033 (1.20) 
 
 
 
-0.008 
(0.28)   
WF1 1.155 (1.01)   
0.278 
(0.24)   
WF1ObsWi 0.018 (1.12)   
0.004 
(0.26)   
WRiskAv -0.240 (0.25)   
-0.056 
(0.06) 
 
 
WHistory -2.541
* 
(1.34)  
 -0.597** 
(0.30) 
 
 
Intercept -4.044
** 
(1.64) 
-2.359* 
(1.27) 
-4.044** 
(1.64)  
 
 
Log-Likelihood -109.44 -66.71 -42.73    
Pseudo R2 0.37 0.25 0.48    
N 252 129 123    
Note. In italics, Robust Std. Error for the Logit regression and Std. Error for Marginal effects.  
Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
WObsWa, F1ObsWa and WF1ObsWa (and ObsWa) are excluded because they predict waiting perfectly (for 
Women).  
Table 3: Logit regression for Depositor 2. 
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Table 4 
 
 
Logit Coefficients Marginal Effect 
 
Pooled Women Men Pooled Women Men 
W 0.424 (2.84)  
 0.019 
(0.13) 
 
 
StrUnc 1.751 (1.24) 
 1.199 
(0.80) 
 1.751 
(1.24) 
0.083 
(0.07) 
 0.063 
(0.07) 
 0.072 
(0.04) 
Risk Aversion -0.071 (0.48) 
-0.091 
(0.11) 
0.071 
(0.15) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
-0.005 
(0.01) 
(0.003 
(0.01) 
History 4.755
*** 
(0.96) 
 6.007* 
(3.12) 
 4.755*** 
(0.96) 
0.209*** 
(0.05) 
 0.305*** 
(0.10) 
 0.180** 
(0.08) 
WStrUnc -0.552 (1.43)   
-0.022 
(0.05)   
WRiskAv -0.162 (0.15)   
-0.007 
(0.01) 
 
 
WHistory 1.252 (3.49)  
 0.055 
(0.15) 
 
 
Intercept -6.619
*** 
(1.81) 
-6.195*** 
(1.98) 
-6.619*** 
(1.81)  
 
 
Log-Likelihood -78.04 -43.54 -34.50    
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.25 0.26    
N 312 159 153    
Note. In italics, Robust Std. Error for the Logit regression and Std. Error for Marginal effects.  
Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Table 4: Logit regression for Depositor 3. 
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Table 5 
 
 
Network Men Women Total Test proportion 
(12,13,23) 63 63 126 1.000 
(12,13) 48 40 88 0.394 
(12,23) 59 55 114 0.708 
(13,23) 59 63 122 0.727 
(12) 58 58 116 1.000 
(13) 59 51 110 0.446 
(23) 51 61 112 0.345 
∅ 53 59 112 0.571 
 450 450 900  
 
Table 5: Observations across networks. 
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Table 6 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Men 5.80 1.94 0 10 
Women 4.97 1.52 0 8 
 
Table 6: Invested amount in the investment game in Gneezy and Potters (1997). 
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Table 7 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Men 2.07 1.05 0 4 
Women 1.33 0.99 0 3 
 
Table 7: Number of times that subjects choose the risky choice. 
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